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The moral consideration of nonhuman animals and the critique of 
speciesism have been defended by appeal to a variety of ethical theo-
ries. One of the main approaches in moral and political philosophy 
today from which to launch such a defense is egalitarianism, which 
is the view that we should aim at favoring the worse off by reducing 
inequality. This paper explains what egalitarianism is and shows the 
important practical consequences it has for nonhuman animals, both 
those that are exploited by humans and those in need of aid in the 
wild. Egalitarianism implies rejecting speciesism, and in practice it 
prescribes ceasing to exploit nonhuman animals as well as assist-
ing them. Moreover, because they are worse off in comparison to 
humans, egalitarianism prescribes giving priority to the interests of 
nonhuman animals. Due to this, egalitarianism gives us extra rea-
sons to defend them beyond those entailed by other nonspeciesist 
approaches.
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1. Introduction
Consider the following cases:
Robin Hood. In some country, a small group of very 
poor people are suffering significantly. Harsh weath-
er conditions have ruined their harvest, and they find 
themselves in terrible indigence. There are, however, 
many other people in this country who are quite rich. 
If the rich gave some of their wealth to the poor, they 
would improve their situation significantly. However, 
they refuse to do so. The rich also claim to have prop-
erty rights which protect against any redistribution 
of their wealth. Nevertheless, a defender of the poor, 
Robin Hood, violates those rights (or alleged rights) by 
stealing from the rich to help the poor.
Shelter. Ten dogs and five pigs live in an animal shelter. 
The shelter facilities are arranged in a way that makes 
it possible for the dogs to have a high quality of life, 
although it leaves the pigs in a rather poor situation. 
Eventually, however, the managers of the shelter carry 
out some space redistributions, giving more room to 
the pigs. As a result, the pigs end up much better off 
than they were before. Neither the pigs nor the dogs 
can now enjoy the great state in which the dogs were 
before. But everyone is still pretty well off, and no one 
has to endure the deplorable conditions the pigs used 
to suffer. In this new arrangement, the increase in the 
happiness of the pigs is smaller than the reduction in 
the happiness of the dogs. But there is greater equality, 
and nobody is miserable.
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Some may claim that what Robin Hood is doing is wrong, 
as it is a violation of the rights of the rich. Others may claim 
that both what Robin Hood did and what the people running 
the shelter did were wrong, because they reduced the total sum 
of happiness in those scenarios. There are many who would 
disagree, however, and claim that Robin Hood and the people 
at the animal shelter did the right thing. Who would claim this? 
Those who affirm that we should fight inequality and give spe-
cial consideration to the interests of the worse off. This claim 
characterizes egalitarianism, and it matches the opinions many 
people hold quite well. No wonder this position has gained 
growing support in moral and political philosophy in the last 
decades (see for instance Berlin 1955–1956; Williams 1973; 
Nagel 1979; 1991; Rae et al. 1981; Arneson 1989; Sen 1980; 
1992; Temkin 1993; Parfit 1995; McKerlie 1996; Roemer 1998; 
Cohen 1989; 2000; Holtug and Lippert-Rasmussen 2006).
Egalitarianism has many important social and political cor-
ollaries for humans, of course. But it also has far more sig-
nificant consequences for nonhuman animals than many would 
think at first. Egalitarianism implies that we should reject 
speciesism (the discrimination against those who don’t belong 
to a certain species, which is commonly directed against non-
human animals [Horta 2010a]) and animal exploitation. More-
over, it entails that the defense of nonhuman animals must be 
a priority for us, since they are worse off than human beings. 
This means that we must not only abstain from harming non-
human animals, but also work actively for them. 
This conclusion shouldn’t be surprising, as the moral con-
sideration of all sentient animals has been defended by way of 
all those theories that are most widely accepted today in eth-
ics. Some theorists have argued for the moral consideration of 
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nonhuman animals by an appeal to some very general moral 
intuitions, with which different ethical perspectives may be 
compatible (Singer 2009 [1974]). Others have taken a pluralist 
approach, combining what different viewpoints say in its de-
fense (Clark 1977; Sapontzis 1987). Others have maintained it 
in light of a Kantian-inspired rights view (Regan (2004 [1983]; 
Pluhar 1995; Francione 2000; Korsgaard 2005; Franklin 2005) 
or a contractarian approach (VandeVeer 1979; Rowlands 1998). 
Others, in accordance with a virtue ethics perspective (Dom-
browski 1984; Nobis 2002; Hursthouse 2006; Abbate 2014). Or 
according to a capabilities approach (Nussbaum 2006). Or a 
utilitarian perspective (Singer 2011 [1979]; Matheny 2006). Or 
care ethics (Donovan and Adams 2007). It would be strange if 
egalitarianism were not added to this list too.
To be sure, most of those who call themselves egalitarians 
have failed to see the implications of egalitarianism for non-
human animals. There have been exceptions (Persson 1993; 
Arneson 1999; Vallentyne 2004; Holtug 2007; Bruers 2014; 
Faria 2014). There was even an early pioneer, Lewis Gompertz 
(1997 [1824]), who defended an egalitarian view and its appli-
cation to nonhuman animals in the early 19th century, advocat-
ing veganism before it even had that name, as well as aiding 
animals in need of help in nature. Still, a detailed explanation 
of the consequences of egalitarianism for nonhuman animals 
hasn’t been carried out yet. Even more importantly, the egali-
tarian approach to the moral consideration of animals remains 
ignored for the most part in the literature on both egalitarian-
ism and animal ethics. As a result, most animal ethicists and 
animal activists with an interest in the ethical foundations of 
concern for nonhuman animals are unaware of it. This is par-
ticularly regrettable since many of them probably have egali-
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tarian intuitions and might readily support this viewpoint if 
they knew about it. 
This paper aims to help to address this lack of awareness 
by explaining how egalitarianism can ground an antispeciesist 
viewpoint. The paper argues that those who reject the conse-
quences that egalitarianism has for nonhuman animals are not 
assuming what egalitarianism actually entails. It also claims 
that egalitarianism places even more importance on the inter-
ests of nonhuman animals than other theories do. 
In order to do this, section 2 describes what egalitarianism 
is, and section 3 clarifies how this view differs from other per-
spectives. Then, section 4 explains what kinds of different egal-
itarian positions there are and argues that similar consequences 
follow from all of them with regard to nonhuman animals. This 
section also distinguishes between a general and a more specif-
ic way to understand what egalitarianism is. Section 5 explains 
why accepting egalitarianism entails considering the interests 
of nonhuman animals and rejecting speciesism. Then, section 6 
explains the practical consequences that follow from rejecting 
speciesism, which entails both ceasing to exploit nonhuman 
animals and helping them actively. Next, section 7 explains 
why egalitarians should give priority to nonhuman animals. It 
argues that nonhuman animals are in general worse off than 
humans, whether they are under human exploitation or they 
live in the wild. Then, section 8 considers an objection to this 
conclusion based on an appeal to moral status and argues that 
such an objection must be rejected. After that, section 9 argues 
that egalitarianism provides extra reasons to defend nonhuman 
animals beyond what other nonspeciesist approaches may en-
tail. Finally, section 10 summarizes and concludes.
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2. What Is Egalitarianism?
To put it very simply, egalitarianism is the view that we 
should aim at reducing inequality. A bit more technically, we 
can say that egalitarianism is the view that we should bring 
about a less inegalitarian distribution of happiness or wellbeing 
(or of whatever else is good), or, alternatively, of what is needed 
in order to achieve that good.
The reasons to defend this view aren’t difficult to guess. In 
the world we live in, some happen to have bad lives (or even 
terrible lives), while others fare quite well. This happens mostly 
for reasons that are completely irrelevant in moral terms (Ber-
lin 1955–1956), or even for reasons that are blatantly immoral. 
In some cases, this is due to oppression, while in others it’s just 
a result of sheer luck. To many of us at least, all this is unfair, 
or just bad. Given two individuals who are equally deserving of 
and have an equal interest in having a good life, why must one 
of them suffer in misery? 
This doesn’t mean that equality is the only thing that matters 
for egalitarians. Consider a situation in which half of a certain 
population are leading very good lives while the other half are 
faring terribly. Suppose we simply reduced the happiness of the 
ones who are doing well to the level of the happiness of those 
who are worse off, but without that leading to any increase in 
the happiness of the worse off (Nozick 1974, 229; Raz 1986, 
chap. 9). That would reduce inequality. However, egalitarians 
can perfectly well claim that this shouldn’t be done. The reason 
is that such an increase in equality would be pointless: it would 
just reduce the happiness of some without benefiting anyone. 
No one has defended such a form of “pure egalitarianism” 
(Parfit 1995) against this intuition. Instead, egalitarians typi-
cally claim that in addition to equality, we should also promote 
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other aims, such as the maximization of general happiness or 
the minimization of suffering and other disvalues. 
Note, of course, that equality isn’t homogeneity; neither is 
inequality diversity. By struggling for equality, we don’t want 
to make us all alike: we simply want no one to be worse off 
than others. 
3. Avoiding confusions
Appeals to equality are common in many fields. But not all 
of those who make them are really defending an egalitarian 
view proper. So in order to understand what egalitarianism is, 
it is important to distinguish it from other views that can be 
confused with it.
Egalitarianism Is More than Equal Consideration or 
Equal Rights
To start with, the kind of equality egalitarianism is con-
cerned with is different from mere equal consideration of inter-
ests. Equal consideration of interests just means that everyone’s 
interests count the same, regardless of whose interests they are.
There are many people who reject equal consideration. Rac-
ists or sexists, for instance, might claim that some people’s 
interests are more important than others’ due to factors such 
as their sex, gender or skin color. The word “equality” is of-
ten used to mean absence of these forms of discrimination. In 
particular, the term “animal equality” often refers to the equal 
consideration of the interests of all sentient animals—this is 
what Singer (2009 [1974]) meant when he used the motto “All 
Animals Are Equal” as the title of the first chapter of his Ani-
mal Liberation; see also Dunayer 2001. In other cases, the term 
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“equality” is used to mean “equal rights,” especially in the 
context of theories which claim that we have moral obligations 
toward others because they have rights, and which treat equal 
consideration and equal rights as equivalent as a result. 
These broad senses of “equality,” however, are different 
from the more restricted meaning associated with egalitarian-
ism. In this context, “equality” denotes a situation in which 
everyone has the same, or very nearly the same, level of happi-
ness (or of any other valuable thing). Accordingly, egalitarian-
ism means more than “equal consideration” or “equal rights.”
Egalitarianism Implies More than a Consideration of 
Marginal Utility
Another idea egalitarianism shouldn’t be confused with is 
the consideration that it’s usually easier to improve the situa-
tion of those who are faring very poorly than that of those who 
are doing pretty well. Suppose that we could give some food 
either to a starving animal or to someone else who has some 
appetite but is generally well fed and has eaten not long ago. 
We know that giving the food to the starving animal is likely 
to have a bigger impact. This is because the more we have, 
the less our situation improves when we get something good 
for us. In economics and philosophy, this is known as the law 
of diminishing marginal utility. Those who simply aim at in-
creasing general happiness and/or reducing the total amount of 
suffering need to take this into account, even if they don’t care 
about equality. Egalitarian views, though, require something 
more. Egalitarianism prescribes helping the worse off instead 
of the better off even when the increase in happiness (or the re-
duction of suffering) that we achieve by helping the worse off is 
smaller than the one that we could achieve by helping the better 
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off. This stronger commitment to the worse off distinguishes 
egalitarianism from those views that only care about maximiz-
ing the total sum of what is valuable, such as utilitarianism.
4. Different Theories with Egalitarian Corollaries
We have seen how egalitarianism distinguishes itself from 
other views. We will now see how different theories that either 
are egalitarian or have widely with egalitarian corollaries must 
be distinguished from each other. 
Consequentialist and Nonconsequentialist Egalitarian-
ism
Some egalitarians claim that the reason why we should fight 
for equality is just that it is bad that some are doing worse than 
others. Their position is an instance of consequentialism, the 
view that we should derive what we should do from a consid-
eration of what states of affairs are better and worse. Others 
may not necessarily accept this, but defend that in any case we 
should do what we can to achieve a more egalitarian situation 
because that is just the right thing to do (Parfit 1995). Their 
position is thus a form of nonconsequentialism, the view that 
at least some of the duties we have do not derive from which 
states of affairs are better than others. In practical terms these 
two views may imply the same course of action, although the 
reasons why they fight inequality are different. 
Equality of What?
Another distinction between egalitarian views has to do 
with the question of what should be the “currency” of equality; 
that is, of what should be enjoyed equally (Sen 1980; Cohen 
1989). According to welfare egalitarianism (Dworkin 1981a) 
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there should be equality of wellbeing or happiness, or of what-
ever else we may consider to be intrinsically good to individu-
als’ happiness. (Note that despite the similarity of its name, 
this position has nothing to do with the view known as “animal 
welfarism.” Animal welfarism is the idea that using animals is 
justified provided that their suffering is minimized, which as-
sumes a speciesist viewpoint [Francione 1995; Haynes 2008]). 
According to another view, resource egalitarianism, there 
should be equality of the resources that are necessary to attain 
happiness (Dworkin 1981b). A middle way supported by others 
has consisted in defending equality of opportunity for happi-
ness (Arneson 1989; Cohen 1989; Roemer 1998). 
There are two main reasons why some defend equality of 
resources. First, the fact that someone has sybarite interests 
to enjoy luxuries shouldn’t be a reason for him or her to have 
more resources than others who are satisfied with less. In reply 
to this, however, we must note that individuals may have dif-
ferent capacities to deal with the same resources, so it would 
be fair if those who have fewer capacities had more resources 
to deal with. Second, with the same resources, some may work 
hard while others may simply relax, so it may not be fair if 
what each of them attains has to be redistributed. This drives 
us to consider yet another distinction among egalitarian views, 
which we will see next.
The Question of Desert and Responsibility 
According to luck egalitarianism, a view that many egalitar-
ians hold, it is bad that some individuals are worse off than oth-
ers for reasons unrelated to their own choices – that is, due to 
a matter of luck (Dworkin 1981b; Temkin 1993; Arneson 2006; 
Knight 2009). Some proponents of this view think that anyone 
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who has knowingly done less than others to deserve the ben-
efits they get, or has tried to benefit at the cost of others, should 
get less than the rest (Dworkin 1981b; Arneson 1989; Kagan 
1998). But others go beyond this view and claim that everyone 
should enjoy an equally good situation, regardless of what they 
have done and how they have behaved towards others (Persson 
2007; Segall 2010, 46–47). 
Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism 
Finally, there is a distinction to be made between egalitari-
anism and another theory that defends egalitarian corollaries. 
Some theorists claim that inequality is not necessarily worse 
than equality, but we should nevertheless give priority to the 
interests of those who are faring worse. This view is called 
prioritarianism and is different from egalitarianism proper. 
However, it has very similar practical consequences (Raz 1986; 
McKerlie 1994; Parfit 1995; Temkin 2003; Holtug 2006) and, 
as a result, the term “egalitarianism” is sometimes used loosely 
to refer to both egalitarianism proper and prioritarianism. Most 
of what we will see in this paper concerning egalitarianism and 
its implications for animals will be true of prioritarianism as 
well. 
5. Equality for Nonhuman Animals
Now that we know what egalitarianism consists in, we can 
consider what it entails for nonhuman animals. 
Egalitarianism Is Concerned with All Sentient Beings
We have seen that egalitarianism is concerned with the dis-
tribution of happiness or welfare, or, more generally, with what 
is valuable (intrinsically or instrumentally). This means that 
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egalitarianism is necessarily concerned with how any entity 
with the capacity to enjoy what is valuable and/or to suffer 
what is disvaluable fares. In other words, egalitarianism is con-
cerned with how anyone who can be in a happy or unhappy 
situation is doing. Egalitarian views consider the interests of 
anyone who has interests to consider; otherwise they would not 
be aiming at decreasing inequality.
Many nonhuman animals, not only vertebrates but a number 
of invertebrates too, are sentient (Smith 1991; Allen and Bekoff 
1997; Sneddon 2004; Elwood 2011). Sentient beings can feel 
suffering and pleasure, so their lives can go well or ill. This 
means that if a certain view is not concerned with the happi-
ness and the harms undergone by nonhuman animals, then it 
will be defending something different from what egalitarian-
ism prescribes. An allegedly egalitarian view which limited its 
scope to humans would thus be as egalitarian as an allegedly 
egalitarian view which limited its scope to males, whites or the 
rich, and vindicated equality just for those who belonged to 
such groups. Such a view would not be a special case of egali-
tarianism; by putting that restriction on who the basic principle 
which constitutes egalitarianism applies to, it would cease to be 
an egalitarian view altogether. 
Egalitarianism Is Incompatible with Speciesism 
It’s often claimed that human interests count for more be-
cause of the cognitive capacities humans have (Leahy 1991; 
Carruthers 1992), because humans have certain relationships 
of solidarity with each other that they don’t have with other an-
imals (Whewell 1852, 223; Petrinovich 1999), or because they 
are more powerful than other animals (Narveson 1987; Gold-
man 2004). However, opponents of speciesism have pointed 
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out that these arguments fail because not all humans satisfy the 
moral criteria they assume (Pluhar 1995; Horta 2014). There 
are many humans (such as children, or some who have suffered 
brain injuries or have some congenital conditions) who lack the 
mentioned cognitive capacities. There are others for whom no 
one feels any sympathy, or who are powerless in comparison 
to other humans (this is the case, for instance, of orphan chil-
dren who are enslaved in many places around the world). If the 
above-mentioned arguments against the equal consideration of 
the interests of all sentient animals were right, it would be jus-
tified to thwart the interests of all these humans. As a result, 
these arguments cannot justify giving inegalitarian preference 
to humans over nonhuman animals. This also shows why these 
arguments shouldn’t be acceptable to most of us, as we don’t 
accept such disadvantageous consideration of certain groups 
of humans. 
Nonetheless, there’s a deeper reason why a theory such as 
egalitarianism must reject that view, and claim it’s actually a 
form of discrimination. For egalitarianism, what matters for 
the consideration of individuals is how they fare. This means 
that what is relevant for being considered is having the capacity 
to fare better or worse, that is, to enjoy what is good and suffer 
what is bad. The capacity that is needed for that is being able 
to feel suffering and/or positive wellbeing. Due to this, all the 
mentioned circumstances (their cognitive capacities or their 
relations with others) cannot be considered relevant in them-
selves. To be sure, they can be contextually relevant when they 
determine in what way a certain individual suffers or enjoys in 
a particular situation. So if in a certain situation having higher 
cognitive capacities makes someone more likely to suffer or 
enjoy more (for instance, if she can anticipate some harm or 
benefit) or less (for instance, if we can alleviate her suffering 
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by consoling her), then that should be taken into account. But 
those capacities only determine the ways in which different in-
dividuals can suffer and enjoy. They are not what distinguishes 
those entities that can feel suffering or wellbeing from those 
that cannot do so. Having the capacity to have a wellbeing and 
to suffer is what distinguishes them. This means that what is 
relevant for moral consideration is whether one has the capac-
ity to fare better or worse—that is, to enjoy what is good and 
suffer what is bad. This, in turn, requires the capacity to feel 
suffering and/or positive wellbeing at all. It also means that 
egalitarianism must reject considering, even in combination 
with this one, any other criteria that would give priority to hu-
man beings over other sentient beings. The reason is simple: 
if we accepted any such criteria, we would not be consider-
ing only the relative situation of each individual (that is, how 
each one is faring), but also other reasons, which would dis-
tort our examination of the question. Accepting those criteria 
would mean considering the interests of different individuals 
unequally. Egalitarianism is incompatible with any view that 
promotes inequality like this. 
Different Egalitarian Theories Have Similar Conse-
quences for Nonhuman Animals
In section 4, we saw that there are different approaches 
within egalitarianism regarding what should be the currency 
of equality and whether we should take desert into account. 
Those different views have been defended by their proponents 
in the context of the discussion regarding equality among hu-
man beings, but they don’t have relevantly different conclu-
sions when applied to nonhuman animals. It’s easy to see that 
the same human practices that entail that nonhuman animals 
are left to suffer and deprived of happiness also deprive them 
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of the resources and the opportunity to enjoy happiness. So 
welfare egalitarianism and resource egalitarianism would have 
the same consequences for nonhuman animals. 
In the same vein, taking desert and responsibility into ac-
count in luck egalitarianism is not going to have different im-
plications for nonhuman animals either, as most nonhuman 
animals cannot reflect on their responsibilities. 
All this can be said in the case of prioritarianism too, since 
its differences from egalitarianism proper don’t affect its con-
cern for the worse off. 
6. Practical Consequences for Nonhuman Ani-
mals
Refraining from Exploiting Nonhuman Animals
Despite the reasons we have just seen for rejecting it, specie-
sism is widely accepted today. Nonhuman animals are system-
atically harmed in many different ways by human beings. This 
is done primarily to obtain a number of animal products out of 
them (that is, the flesh of the animals, their eggs, milk, skin, 
feathers, etc.), as well as services that entail their exploitation 
(for entertainment, in laboratories, for labor, etc.). Such harms 
are not trivial ones. They include terrible suffering during most 
of their lives (mainly in land farms and fish farms) and depriv-
ing them of any or almost any possible positive experiences 
they could have, by confining them and, in particular, by kill-
ing them (Mason and Singer, 1990 [1980]; Eisnitz 1997; Mood 
2010; Mood and Brooke 2012). 
In this way, animal exploitation incessantly generates harm 
and increases inequality between humans and the nonhumans 
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they exploit. It does this by benefiting (in trivial ways) the bet-
ter off (i.e, humans) by means of harming (in extreme ways) 
the worse off (nonhuman animals) (Norcross 2004; McPherson 
2014; Bruers 2015). This couldn’t contradict more what egali-
tarianism prescribes. Consistent egalitarianism thus compels 
us to be vegan.
Egalitarianism Entails Helping Nonhuman Animals
As we have seen, concern for those who are worse off im-
plies refraining from harming them, but also trying to improve 
their situation. Due to this, egalitarianism not only asks that 
each of us ceases to harm animals; it also demands that we help 
them actively. There are two main ways to do this: 
(1) Doing activism to spread an antispeciesist view-
point. 
(2) Helping those animals who aren’t exploited by hu-
mans, but who are nevertheless in need of aid (as hap-
pens in the case of many animals who suffer and die 
due to natural causes). 
It isn’t difficult to see why an egalitarian concern for the 
worse off compels us to do this. If an animal suffers some 
harm, it’s irrelevant for her or his situation whether we or 
someone else have caused that harm (at least when that harm is 
totally undeserved). In fact, this is something that many other 
ethical theories take into account just as egalitarianism does. 
All that is required for this is that an ethical theory prescribes 
two things: (a) that it’s bad that someone suffers or is deprived 
of her happiness, and good that she is happy or spared from 
suffering; and (b) that what we should do depends, either com-
pletely or to some extent, on what is good or bad. 
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Spreading Veganism
The reasons presented above imply that egalitarianism 
doesn’t just require us to go vegan. It also requires us to do 
activism for veganism and against speciesism (Faria 2014). In 
fact, considering that we are in a far better situation than non-
human animals are, egalitarianism requires that we spend sig-
nificant time and effort on activism in order to have the greatest 
possible impact in their favor. To be sure, individual vegans 
who are not involved in activism have some impact on animals 
already, not only by reducing the demand for animal products 
and services, but by making veganism more visible in society 
as well. However, an activist, even if she doesn’t work full time 
for nonhuman animals, makes a much more significant impact 
than several (or perhaps many) inactive vegans.  
Helping Animals in Nature
As egalitarianism implies rejecting speciesism, it entails 
that we should help those in need regardless of whether they are 
humans, nonhumans either enslaved by or living with humans, 
or nonhumans living in the wild. Of course, we shouldn’t help 
anyone if it means leaving others in a worse situation than 
where those we’ve helped began. But when we can aid those 
who are suffering or dying in the wild in a way that increases 
happiness and equality and reduces the harms suffered by sen-
tient beings overall, we should do it (Sapontzis 1987; Ng 1995; 
Cowen 2003; Fink 2005; Nussbaum 2006; Holtug 2007; Horta 
2010b; Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011; Sözmen 2013; Faria and 
Paez 2015; Cunha 2015; Tomasik 2015a; Torres 2015). 
Many people are puzzled at this suggestion because they 
agree with a widespread idyllic view of nature according to 
which nonhuman animals live great lives in the wild (notable 
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exceptions include Mill 1904 [1874]; Darwin 2005 (1908), 94; 
Gould 1994 and Dawkins 1995). Unfortunately, animal popula-
tion dynamics gives us strong reasons to conclude that this is 
not the case. The vast majority of animals reproduce by having 
huge numbers of offspring. A female mouse can give birth to 
more than a hundred babies, other animals such as frogs and 
many invertebrates can lay thousands of eggs, and some spe-
cies of fishes can lay millions, or even hundreds of millions of 
eggs (Sagoff 1984; Stearns 1992, 151; Ng 1995). On average, 
only one offspring per parent survives (otherwise we would 
see populations multiplying astronomically all the time). Most 
of the others die shortly after coming into existence, often in 
painful ways, such as starving or being eaten by other animals 
(Ng 1995; Faria and Paez 2015; Tomasik 2015a). Their very 
short lives often contain little more than their painful deaths, 
meaning that they include more suffering than happiness. In 
addition, even those animals that survive to maturity suffer for 
a number of reasons, including disease and parasitism, hun-
ger and malnutrition, injuries, attacks by other animals, hostile 
weather conditions and sometimes psychological stress. This 
shows that the suffering of nonhuman animals in the wild is a 
very serious issue and that in those cases in which we can help 
these animals without causing more harm, we have reasons 
to do it. This conclusion can be reached from many different 
viewpoints, though it has remained largely unaddressed until 
recently. It is one that both deontological theories making room 
for positive rights and utilitarianism will accept. Virtue and 
care ethics approaches that regard helping those in need as part 
of what virtuous or caring agents should do will also support it. 
It is also a conclusion that follows from egalitarianism.
Oscar HOrta
127
© Between the Species, 2016
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 19, Issue 1
7. Why the Interests of Nonhuman Animals 
Should Be a Priority
In spite of what we have just seen, some might agree that 
egalitarians should do activism to help the worse off, but still 
claim that they need not do activism for nonhuman animals and 
should focus on those humans in need of help instead. 
This would be right if human beings were worse off than 
nonhuman animals. This is a very intuitive view, as we are all 
aware that many humans find themselves in appalling situa-
tions. However, it’s also intuitive to most of us because we fail 
to properly imagine what the situation of nonhuman animals is 
really like. Suppose you could choose between either living the 
life of a malnourished human in poverty or that of an immo-
bilized rabbit whose eyes are destroyed by chemicals without 
any painkiller, only to be killed afterwards. Or between that 
of a war refugee or that of a calf separated from his mother, 
kept in isolation in a crate so small he cannot turn around, and 
killed a few weeks later. Or between that of a child working 
under terribly exploitative conditions in a dangerous factory 
in a poor country or that of a small fish who after getting out 
of her egg, fails to find any food and starves to death. No one 
would truly believe that the lives of these nonhuman animals 
are better than these humans’ lives, even though the humans 
are in terrible situations. It’s true that there are humans who 
face excruciating suffering at certain points in their lives (for 
instance, political prisoners undergoing torture, or women be-
ing raped). Yet if we consider their whole lives compared to the 
lives of many nonhuman animals such as the ones mentioned 
above, it doesn’t seem that the animals’ lives are preferable. We 
have no grounds to assume the plight of these human beings 
is more significant than the suffering of nonhumans who are 
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eaten alive, fall victim to painful procedures at laboratories, or 
are boiled or skinned alive at a slaughterhouse.
This is not to devalue the terrible situation of many humans 
such as the ones mentioned above. It just means recognizing 
that the assumption that nonhuman animals can’t be in situa-
tions that are as bad or worse is no longer tenable when we look 
closely at to what the lives of nonhuman animals are really like. 
It is likely that many people will deny this, not out of an im-
partial assessment of the situation of nonhumans and humans, 
but rather because they have much less empathy for the former 
than for the latter. 
This doesn’t mean that every nonhuman animal fares worse 
than every human being. In fact, there are huge differences 
between the situations of different humans, and the same is 
true of nonhuman animals. There is an (unfortunately tiny) 
minority of nonhuman animals who live happy lives. Some 
nonhuman animals are therefore better off than some humans. 
It is also true, however, that very few humans have lives as 
bad overall as the lives that many animals have to endure. It is 
safe to conclude that, in general, humans are the better off and 
nonhumans are the worse off. Accordingly, if we accept egali-
tarianism, we must reject the common assumption that human 
interests should take priority over those of nonhuman animals. 
When we consider the number of individuals involved, this 
conclusion is reinforced. Up to 60 billion mammals and birds 
are killed in slaughterhouses each year (FAO 2014). The num-
ber of aquatic animals killed by humans is much higher. It has 
been estimated that between 1 and 3 trillion aquatic vertebrates 
or more were fished in 2009 (Mood 2010). In addition, humans 
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kill or inflict terrible suffering on millions of other animals for 
other purposes.
Given that human beings currently live seven decades on 
average, and that the number of human beings is now around 
7 billion (US Census Bureau 2014), this means that during our 
lifetime, dozens of trillions of animals are harmed very signifi-
cantly. For each of us, many thousand nonhuman animals are 
harmed terribly. 
This does not even include the colossal number of animals 
suffering in nature, in situations in which humans are capable 
of helping. According to some estimates, the number of animals 
excluding nematodes (but including arthropods) living in the 
wild may be many orders of magnitude higher than the number 
of animals killed by humans every year, reaching between 1018 
and 1021 (Tomasik 2015b [2009]). Let us assume the more con-
servative end of that figure. Suppose now, again conservatively, 
that for each adult animal only 100 baby animals die in misery 
shortly after coming into existence (even though, as we saw 
above, many animals lay thousands or even millions of eggs). 
That would mean that the total number of baby animals whose 
lives consist in little more than dying just after starting to exist 
would be around 1020. This is a staggering figure, more than 
ten billion times higher than the number of human beings alive.
To be sure, there are other reasons one might give priority to 
nonhuman animals. For instance, there are many more people 
doing activism for humans than for nonhuman animals, which, 
added to the fact that they are the worse off, makes helping 
nonhuman animals more efficient in terms of promoting well-
being. But these are different reasons from the one presented 
above, and egalitarianism would still require us to pay special 
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attention to nonhuman animals even if it wasn’t the most ef-
ficient way to maximize wellbeing.
8. Why the Appeal to the Status of Humans 
Doesn’t Limit the Extent of Egalitarian Concern 
for Nonhuman Animals
One theorist who has written about equality and animals, 
Peter Vallentyne (2004), has tried to resist the argument pre-
sented above. He wonders if we could say that humans have 
a higher moral status, so their interests should count for more 
even when their interests are less important ones. However, this 
argument doesn’t work. If our theory defends equality of some 
value, then the capacity to be a recipient of that value is what 
matters. So if we defend a view that aims to reduce inequality 
in the wellbeing of different individuals, then the capacity to 
have a (positive or negative) wellbeing is the only morally rel-
evant circumstance, and any other capacities or circumstanc-
es are morally irrelevant. If an appeal to moral status entails 
something different from the consideration of the capacity to 
have a wellbeing, then such an appeal can’t be grounded on 
anything morally relevant. 
Nils Holtug (2007) has pointed out that there is a reason 
that explains why Vallentyne and others try to avoid the non-
speciesist consequences of egalitarianism: we have all grown 
up in speciesist societies, and, as a result of it, most people have 
strongly speciesist attitudes. We are taught during our whole 
lives that humans have greater moral worth than nonhuman 
animals, so this seems obviously true to us. However, once we 
get rid of speciesist biases we can see that equality for all sen-
tient animals follows from accepting egalitarianism. 
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9. Why Egalitarianism Gives Us Extra Reasons 
to Defend Nonhuman Animals
Egalitarianism agrees with other ethical views that we 
should reject speciesism, but it differs in the practical corol-
laries that follow from rejecting speciesism. We will now com-
pare what egalitarianism and other views prescribe.
Why Egalitarianism Rejects Sacrificing the Worse Off 
for the Sake of Aggregated Happiness
First, consider the view that we should maximize the sum 
total of happiness minus suffering, regardless of its distribution 
(as utilitarianism claims). Contrary to this view, an egalitarian 
would not accept animal exploitation even if the harm inflicted 
on the exploited was smaller than the benefit that others would 
obtain from that exploitation. We can understand their opposi-
tion in light of the two examples from section 1. In those ex-
amples, the actions that Robin Hood and the managers of the 
animal shelter take reduce the total sum of happiness. While 
utilitarians would oppose these actions and the resulting de-
crease in total happiness, egalitarianism supports them, as they 
lead to a better distribution of happiness in favor of the worse 
off.
Why Egalitarianism Claims No Right or Partiality Can 
Justify Favoring the Better Off over the Worse Off
We might think that protecting the worse off is actually the 
motivation why many people defend rights views. They may 
think it unfair, for instance, that some have to fare ill because 
that’s good for the ones that are better off, as utilitarianism 
may in some cases entail. And they may think that the way to 
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defend the worse off from this is by claiming that we should all 
have rights that can never be violated.
However, this isn’t so. It’s possible that by respecting some-
one’s rights we could harm the worse off and perpetuate in-
equality, as the Robin Hood example shows. Recall that in that 
example the better off have a right not to have any of their 
wealth taken from them. If by taking away some of what’s 
theirs, we could benefit others who are equally deserving but 
worse off, then respecting that right will only maintain in-
equality. So egalitarianism claims that Robin Hood does the 
right thing. 
Just as utilitarianism allows us to harm (or refuse to help) 
the worse off as long as it sufficiently benefits those who are 
better off, rights theories that protect the better off from any 
redistribution of benefits are also harmful for the worse off. 
This cannot be accepted from an egalitarian viewpoint (setting 
aside matters of desert and responsibility). Of course, if thwart-
ing the interests of the better off would leave them in an even 
worse situation than the situation in which the worse off began, 
then egalitarianism would reject doing it. 
On the other hand, sometimes people use the term “rights” 
to mean simply that individuals need to be morally considered. 
If we accept this definition, then it is clear that egalitarians 
must accept and defend the proposition that all sentient indi-
viduals have rights. 
Also, according to most current legal systems, nonhuman 
animals are considered things; they have the legal status of 
property. Egalitarians can reject this and advocate the granting 
of legal rights to nonhuman animals because legal protection 
of the interests of individuals is carried out by means of legal 
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rights. However, favoring legal rights because they currently 
are the best way the law can protect the interests of all sentient 
beings does not undermine the above critique of moral rights 
theories that oppose equality. In addition, if some legal rights 
reinforce inequality, then they shouldn’t be accepted.
In a similar vein, egalitarianism also opposes giving priority 
to some who are better off over the worse off because of some 
special or close relationship we share with them. The reasons 
for this have been stated above when we saw the different ways 
in which speciesism is defended. The existence of a certain 
type of relationship with someone is not by itself relevant to 
being better off or worse off, so according to egalitarians it 
shouldn’t be a reason for one’s interest to take priority over the 
interests of others.
Why Egalitarianism Focuses on the Situation of Sentient 
Beings, rather than on Our Moral Character or Relations
Some other viewpoints in ethics don’t state specific courses 
of action we should follow, but instead claim that there are cer-
tain character traits we should have. Those who take these ap-
proaches can still defend the same courses of action that egali-
tarians support by claiming that those with a sound moral char-
acter should care primarily for the worse off. However, they 
may also reject this line of thinking, and thus disagree with 
what egalitarianism prescribes. On the other hand, egalitarians 
claim that what’s fundamentally important is not really wheth-
er moral agents have a good moral character or not, but whether 
their decisions benefit those who need it. They can argue that if 
ethics has any sense at all, it is because it can make the world a 
better place. But if this is so, what matters is actually how in-
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dividuals are affected, for good or bad, by the actions of moral 
agents, rather than whether agents display a good character. 
10. Conclusion
There’s a considerably extensive literature on speciesism 
and animal ethics nowadays, and a far more extensive litera-
ture on egalitarianism. Despite this, most theorists of egalitari-
anism have never reckoned the very important consequences 
for nonhuman animals that this theory has. Also, there are 
many opponents of the discrimination of nonhuman animals 
who aren’t familiar with egalitarianism. This is all quite un-
derstandable, given, firstly, the wide prevalence of speciesism, 
and secondly, that many of those who have written in animal 
ethics have defended other ethical approaches. However, it’s 
high time for all this to change. Many people have egalitarian 
ideas, even though they may have never heard of egalitarian 
theory. Many of us oppose inequality, and think the worse off 
deserve special attention. We have seen that this position has 
important consequences for nonhuman animals. They include 
rejecting speciesism, not harming them for our benefit, getting 
involved in doing activism for them, and being ready to help 
them, especially in the case of those living in the wild. More-
over, egalitarianism also entails that, given the situation many 
nonhuman animals currently are in, concern for them should 
be a priority for us. 
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